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Overview
 The U.S. financial sector expanded dramatically 
over the last hundred years in both relative and 
absolute terms. This expansion has had a number 
of causes and consequences, most of which can 
be lumped broadly under the heading of increased 
“financialization” of the economy. This led, in 
part, to the financial crisis of 2008/2009. In this 
paper, however, we consider the implications 
of financialization for the structure of the U.S. 
economy, in particular for entrepreneurship.
A Historical Overview
 A financial industry plays an important role in 
any modern economy. It provides widely varying 
principal and intermediation services to households 
and corporations—services that sometimes are 
simple, but often complex. The services range from 
lending, to stock brokerage, to complex securities, 
to real estate and insurance, among many others.
 The industry has changed considerably in its 
importance over the last 160 years.1 As Figure 1 
shows, the U.S. industry’s share of domestic 
GDP was at its lowest during the mid-nineteenth 
century, when it hovered between 1 percent and 
2.5 percent. From 1900 to 1930, however, it rose 
steadily, before peaking at approximately 6 percent 
of GDP at the beginning of the Great Depression. It 
then fell sharply in importance over the next fifteen 
years. The industry resumed its rise in 1945 and has 
yet to peak, having touched 8.4 percent of U.S. GDP 
in the last two years. 
 Why the industry has changed in relative 
importance over time is a crucial question. After all, 
unlike other sectors, in a true Arrow-Dubreu economy, 
the financial services industry would not exist in 
Figure 1: Financial Sector as Percentage of U.S. GDP: 1850–2009
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Source: The Evolution of the US Financial Industry from 1860 to 2007: Theory and Evidence. NBER.
1. In this paper, we use “financial services” in reference to the Finance and Insurance sector, NAICS sectoral code 52. Many commentators often discuss “FIRE:” 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, adding NAICS sectoral code 53. While there is clearly an intimate (and lately damaging) relationship between finance and real 
estate, for our purposes here we exclude real estate—thus sadly depriving ourselves of clever wordplay on the “FIRE economy.”
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anything like its present form.2 Its intermediating 
functions would be simple and, thus, readily provided 
by a much smaller and less-profitable sector. Such is 
demonstrably not the case, however, so it is worth 
considering why the industry has grown to be as large 
and systemically important as it has become. 
 Across its history, the financial services industry’s 
periods of more-rapid growth have generally been 
tied to periods during economic history when the 
need for financial intermediation was growing 
sharply. For example, the financial services industry’s 
rise in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries corresponded to the appearance of 
railroads and early, large-scale manufacturing.  
Its next sharp rise, in the 1930s, corresponded to 
the build-out of the U.S. electrical grid, as well as 
rapid growth in the automobile and pharmaceutical 
industries.3 We subsequently can see a sharp 
increase in financial services as a percentage of 
GDP from 1980 to the late 1990s, with a proximate 
cause this time being the financing of waves  
of information technology, culminating in the 
Internet boom.4 
 Not all periods of more-rapid U.S. economic 
growth have, however, coincided with a significant 
increase in financial services’ relative role in the 
economy. For example, as the above figure shows, 
the 1960s were a period of substantial economic 
growth, but were accompanied by only a tiny 
increase in financial services’ growth as a percentage 
of GDP.
 In general, however, and most importantly 
for this paper, there should be no question that 
the financial services sector plays a key role for 
entrepreneurs. It helps reduce moral hazard, while 
mitigating adverse selection problems that otherwise 
might exist for young companies that lack long 
track records or significant collateral. To pretend 
otherwise—to pretend that we can have widespread 
entrepreneurial capitalism in the absence of a 
significant and active financial services sector—is to 
be fanciful.5 At the same time, however, financial 
services and entrepreneurial ventures compete in the 
economy for many of the same employees. Given 
that the social returns from entrepreneurial efforts 
generally are higher than the private ones, this can 
be a source of allocative inefficiency in the economy, 
one with potentially material consequences.6 
 Having said the preceding, all observers of the 
U.S. economy should be concerned when the 
financial sector’s activities increasingly feed back 
on the sector, rather than on the “real” economy. 
We have recently seen a consequence of the 
2008 financial crisis. There are more and other 
consequences, and we focus on some of them in 
this paper—in particular, the effect of financial 
services growth and capital misallocation on young, 
growth companies. As John Maynard Keynes 
memorably said, “When the capital development of 
a country becomes the byproduct of the activities of 
a casino, the job is not likely to be well done.”7 
Financialization and  
the Economy
 The U.S. financial sector’s rise to relative economic 
importance is historically unprecedented. Even 
during the peak years leading up to the Great 
Depression, the U.S. financial services industry 
never rose above 6 percent of GDP, a figure that 
took until 1990 for it to regain. Since then, the 
industry has continued to carve out an ever-larger 
position for itself in the economy, to the point that 
it now employs 6.5 million people and accounts 
for 8.3 percent of GDP. This share of the economy 
quadrupled since the end of World War II, and gross 
output of finance and insurance rose by 97 percent 
2. Philippon, T. 2008. The Evolution of the US Financial Industry from 1860 to 2007: Theory and Evidence. NBER.
3. Ibid.
4. On the relationship between technological breakthroughs and their cause-and-effect correspondence with finance, see generally Carlota Perez, Technological 
Revolutions and Financial Capital: The Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages (Edward Elgar, 2002).
5. This has been recognized by economists for at least a century. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (first published in German 
in 1911). 
6. Philippon, T. (2007). Financiers vs. Engineers: Should the Financial Sector be Taxed or Subsidized? NBER Working Paper. 2007:(October):1–27. 
Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1024974.
7. Keynes, J.M. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Atlantic Publishers & Distributors. 2006:400:140.
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from 1997 to 2007, outpacing the 70 percent rise in 
gross output across all American sectors.8 
 Some recent changes have been a function of 
the information technology industry’s appearance 
and growth. This industry has required immense 
investment, from new companies receiving venture 
capital to larger companies requiring banking services 
for public offerings, mergers, and other transactions. 
 It is not clear, however, that the increasing share 
of U.S. GDP accounted for by financial services is 
entirely a function of the growth of new, capital-
intensive sectors like information technology. That 
industry is maturing rapidly, while newer variants, 
like “Web 2.0,” are less capital intensive; at the 
same time, funding is flat or even declining in 
other sectors, like life sciences. With fewer initial 
public offerings being conducted, and with rapid 
consolidation in financial services (especially since 
the 2008 crisis), instead it seems that the finance 
economy’s rise largely has been a function of 
the financial economy detaching from the real 
economy. Thinking of it in flow terms, consumers 
and businesses increasingly have used debt to fuel 
asset purchases that, in turn, became collateral 
for additional debt and asset purchases. This was 
not a productive capital allocation in the broader 
economy, but it did generate higher returns in the 
short run.
 Innovation has driven some of the increased size 
of the financial sector. Developments in technology 
have greatly increased the nature, flow, and scope 
of financial products, thus increasing the size of 
the sector in both relative and absolute terms. In 
particular, the rapid expansion of financial services 
over the past few decades has been directly tied 
to continued advances in information technology. 
As a result, there are new and growing pressures 
to increase the size of the sector and increase the 
financial-centricity of modern economies.
 We investigate the effects of this misallocation in 
the following section. 
Financialization’s 
Consequences
 Capital increasingly flows toward financial assets 
and in service of the further financialization of 
the economy, which has many consequences. The 
main characteristics of this change are summarized 
usefully by Dore (2008) 9 as follows:
1. An increase in the proportion of the income 
generated by the industrial/post-industrial 
economies, which accrues to those engaged in 
the finance industry, as a consequence of  
three things:
a. The growth in and increasing complexity 
of intermediating activities, very largely of 
a speculative kind, between savers and the 
users of capital in the real economy.
b. The increasingly strident assertion of 
owners’ property rights as transcending 
all other forms of social accountability for 
business corporations.
c. Increasing efforts on the government’s part 
to promote an “equity culture” in the belief 
that it will enhance the ability of its own 
nationals to compete internationally.
 We are focused on the first of these 
financialization characteristics. In particular, we 
want to understand their consequences for the 
non-financial economy. Given the larger income 
share accounted for by the financial sector, and 
given the increasingly speculative activities taken 
on by the financial sector, what have been the 
effects in the real economy? How, for example, has 
financialization increased (decreased) the number 
of entrepreneurs in the economy? How has it been 
made easier (harder) for companies to be created, 
or to raise money? Given that one function of 
finance in a capitalist economy is to help fund new 
business ventures, what effect has financialization 
had on entrepreneurship in the United States? 
While we have no base case, so we cannot know 
precisely how the economy would look in the 
absence of financialization, we can characterize 
8. Bureau of Economic Analysis.
9. Dore, R. Financialization of the global economy. Industrial and Corporate Change. 2008:17(6):1097–1112. Available at 
http://icc.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/icc/dtn041.
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its size and nature, thus permitting some sense of 
financialization’s consequences. 
The Increasing Size of the 
Financial Sector
 Capital flows to where it earns the highest risk-
adjusted returns. Recent decades have seen very 
large swings in capital allocation in the economy 
as returns have shifted and capital followed. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, for example, information 
technology was a significant capital consumer, with 
many important companies being created, financed, 
and eventually going public or being acquired. 
 The returns generated on capital invested in these 
companies attracted more capital in a virtuous cycle. 
This new capital, in turn, was allocated by new 
financial services firms, ranging from brokerage firms 
to, and in particular, venture capital and private 
equity partnerships, both of which saw massive 
expansion in assets under management in the 
period. This process, despite its defensible origins, 
eventually broke down during the late 1990s’ 
dot-com bubble, when the financial economy 
“detached” from the real one, making the financing 
and initial public offerings of unprofitable young 
companies an end in itself. Over the subsequent 
decade leading to 2010, the venture capital industry 
saw its returns go into a tailspin, with, eventually, 
negative internal rate of return (IRR).10 While there 
was much job destruction at the end of this period, 
most studies show that, overall, the dot-com bubble 
produced net new jobs. Further, we can even argue 
that the incredible entrepreneurial speciation that 
occurred during the period was not historically 
unprecedented, with prior waves of new technology 
adoption being accompanied by financial booms 
and busts.11 
 At the same time, the financial services sector 
itself has been a significant capital consumer. The 
growth in venture capital and private equity firms 
is just one example. The hedge fund industry has 
soared in size during the last three decades, with it 
now managing more than a trillion dollars. Similarly, 
the fund management industry—with mutual 
funds and exchange-traded funds being the largest 
parts—has grown tremendously in assets under 
management and employment. 
 We also must consider the brokerage industry’s 
changes. Its importance to various regional 
economies is well known, especially to New York, 
where it is far and away the largest employer. 
Having said the preceding, Figure 2 reveals that the 
10. See, e.g., Paul Kedrosky, “Right-Sizing the U.S. Venture Capital Industry,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009, at 
http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/USVentCap061009r1.pdf.
11. Perez, C. Technological roots and structural implications of the double bubble at the turn of the century. 2009:(31):1–31. Available at  
http://www.dspace.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/225149. 
Figure 2: Employment in Finance and Insurance
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financial services industry’s employment growth in 
the last twenty years, especially since the dot-com 
collapse, does not seem striking, at least at first 
glance.
 What this time-series analysis misses, however, is 
the changing makeup of Wall Street’s hiring. Fewer 
people are being added to industry employment, 
but they are coming from new and narrower places. 
The financial services industry used to consider it 
a point of pride to hire hungry and eager young 
high school and college graduates, planning to train 
them on the job in sales, trading, research, and 
investment banking. While that practice continues, 
even if in smaller numbers, the difference now is 
that most of the industry’s profits come from the 
creation, sales, and trading of complex products, 
like the collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that 
played a central role in the recent financial crisis. 
These new products require significant financial 
engineering, often entailing the recruitment of 
master’s- and doctoral-level new graduates of 
science, engineering, math, and physics programs. 
Their talents have made them well-suited to the 
design of these complex instruments, in return for 
which they often make starting salaries five times or 
more what their salaries would have been had they 
stayed in their own fields and pursued employment 
with more tangible societal benefits. 
 Figure 3 uses MIT data to demonstrate this 
trend. It shows that the financial sector, while 
long a significant recruiter of new graduates in 
technical disciplines, saw serious gains in the early 
part of the last decade, going from 18 percent 
of all graduates in 2003 to almost 25 percent in 
2006. Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz similarly 
found that Harvard graduates in the early 1990s 
entered financial occupations at a far higher pace 
than Harvard graduates did in the 1970s.12 The 
2008 crisis has caused a sharp decline in technical 
recruiting by the financial services industry, with, 
for the first time in more than a decade, financial 
services no longer acting as the largest recruiter of 
new technical graduates. We return shortly to the 
consequences of this change. Likewise, researchers 
have found that, while the science, math, 
engineering, and technology fields successfully 
retained students at an increasing rate from the 
1970s to the 1990s, retention rates of the highest-
12. See Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz, “Transitions: Career and Family Life Cycles of the Educational Elite,” American Economic Review: Papers and 
Proceedings. 2008:98(2):363.
Figure 3: Fields of Entry for Graduates of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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13. Lowell, B. Lindsay, et al., “Steady as She Goes? Three Generations of Students through the Science and Engineering Pipeline.” Paper presented at the Association for 
Public Policy Analysis and Management, November 2009, at http://policy.rutgers.edu/faculty/salzman/SteadyAsSheGoes.pdf.
performing students fell steeply in the 1990s and 
early 2000s: 
[T]op STEM majors may be responding to 
market forces and incentives … Highly qualified 
students may be choosing a non-STEM job 
because these other occupations are higher 
paying, offering better career prospects, such 
as advancement, employment stability, and/
or prestige, as well as less-susceptible to 
offshoring. There are numerous accounts of 
financial firms hiring top-performing STEM 
graduates at much higher salaries than those 
offered by STEM employers.13 
 This shift is borne out, at least partially, by data 
on where in the economy scientists and engineers 
can be found. Indeed, by 2006, the Securities and 
Commodities Exchanges sub-sector accounted 
for the twelfth-highest share of science and 
engineering employment by sub-sector, ahead of 
semiconductor manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, 
and telecommunications (Figure 4). This sub-sector’s 
share was more than four times the average.
 This distribution of human capital and, 
accordingly, wages falls into a long historical 
pattern: “The relative skill intensity and relative 
wages of the financial sector exhibit a U-shaped 
pattern from 1909 to 2006.” Prior to the 1930s, 
Figure 4: Science and Engineering Employment by Sector, 2006
(average across all sectors: 4.6 percent)
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the American financial sector was a “high-skill, 
high-wage industry.” A variety of factors, including 
technology and regulation, dampened the human 
capital and wage premiums for the subsequent 
half-century. Around 1980, however, the situation 
reversed and finance once again became a high-
skill and high-wage sector, thus attracting people 
from a wide range of financial and non-financial 
backgrounds.14
 Capital, including human capital, flows to the 
opportunities with the highest risk-adjusted returns, 
but those opportunities’ perceived merits are subject 
to distortions. Regulations can change capital 
allocations, as can feed processes. In the latter 
case, capital can begin to feed on itself, with higher 
asset prices inducing more investments, and thus 
generating still higher prices, a misallocating process 
that continually feeds on itself—until it stops, often 
unhappily and expensively.15 The subject of capital 
misallocation is much broader than this paper, but 
suffice it to say that capital misallocation happens, 
and has consequences.
 What are the consequences of capital 
misallocation? Fundamentally, it means that 
capital—both human and financial—is being 
inefficiently allocated in the economy, with the 
result being that some sectors and opportunities 
are being starved, relatively speaking, while other 
sectors see a flood of capital, potentially producing 
a positive feedback cycle that exacerbates one or 
both of the preceding effects. In particular, capital 
misallocation can lead to inflated (deflated) asset 
prices, lower productivity, less innovation, less 
entrepreneurship, and, thereby, lowered job creation 
and overall economic growth. The mechanism 
that creates each of these effects is, of course, the 
flow of capital in the economy as exacerbated and 
distorted by financialization.
Entrepreneurship without 
Financialization
 Having recognized the consequences of 
financialization and capital misallocation, it is 
now time to consider the direct effects of these 
distortions on entrepreneurship in the United States. 
If we consider financial services firms’ percentage 
of U.S. GDP and, then, as a counterfactual, model 
a return to historical norms, we can begin to 
tentatively assess financialization’s consequences. 
 Financial services peaked at almost 9 percent 
of U.S. GDP in its most recent upswing. In the 
preceding decades, its share had been volatile, but it 
had averaged roughly four percentage points lower, 
or approximately 5 percent of GDP. Were that to be 
the case again, what might the consequences be to 
entrepreneurship? To answer this question, we first 
must look at potential consequences the financial 
sector’s explosive growth had on entrepreneurship 
over the past several decades. In terms of an 
aggregate picture, Figure 5 compares the economic 
value that finance and insurance have added since 
1947 to varying measurements of new business 
formation. Financial services have been on a steady 
upward march since the end of World War II. Since 
1980, firm formation rates in the United States 
have fallen slightly and then hit a plateau, with only 
minor fluctuations from year to year (Figure 5).
 The financial services sector’s increasing growth 
is not the sole or necessarily the largest cause 
of falling and flattening new business formation 
rates, but it does appear to have a role. As the 
chart illustrates, per-capita rates of new business 
formation in the 1980s and 1990s were not much 
different from those in the 1940s and 1950s and, 
in fact, recent rates are lower than they were in 
the early 1980s. The reasons behind this stagnation 
in entrepreneurship (or, more positively, its steady 
maintenance and non-decline) are a persistent 
puzzle.16 The discussion in this paper so far suggests 
one potential culprit: the metastasizing financial 
14. Philippon, T., and Ariell Reshef, “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006,” December 2008. The authors also showed the rising 
disparity between the wages of “financiers” and engineers working in non-financial sectors, particularly after 1980.
15. See, e.g., Hyman Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy (McGraw-Hill, 1986).
16. See, e.g., Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Exploring Firm Formation: Why is the Number of New Firms Constant?” Kauffman Foundation Research Series on 
Firm Formation and Economic Growth, Paper No. 2, January 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/exploring_firm_formation_1-13-10.pdf.
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Figure 5: Finance and Entrepreneurship
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sector, which potentially could have affected the 
flow of entrepreneurial talent. 
 As the data on MIT graduates and the sectoral 
share of science and engineering employment 
suggest, it is conceivable that some degree of 
talent allocation between entrepreneurship and 
employment was affected by the rise of finance. 
Recall Figure 3: If we presuppose that some fraction 
of those scientists and engineers working in the 
financial sector would otherwise have started 
companies, we can imagine perhaps a slight effect 
of financialization on potential entrepreneurship. 
This also points to a question of the quality of 
companies being started, which we discuss below. 
It is difficult, again, to make firm statements 
as to causation, but the historical data seem to 
suggest that a two-way feedback effect exists. 
Financialization could have a suppressive effect on 
potential entrepreneurship by draining away human 
capital. Conversely, an underlying decrease (or, at 
least, not an increase) in entrepreneurship creates 
a shortage of new financing opportunities for the 
financial sector, meaning the sector must find other 
outlets in which to be innovative and make money 
from money—causing the sector to expand.
 Entrepreneurship volume, of course, provides an 
incomplete picture of the effect of new companies 
on the economy. And, as we’ve seen, the level of 
firm formation in the United States apparently has 
not changed much over the past thirty, and perhaps 
sixty, years, even as the economy as a whole has 
undergone various frissons and comedowns. Just 
because the aggregate velocity of firm formation 
has not changed even as finance has exploded in 
size does not mean that finance has suppressed 
entrepreneurship or had no effect on the types 
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of firms founded and their performance. Two 
indicators that offer a better window inside the 
volume of entrepreneurship are the numbers of fast-
growing firms and initial public offerings (IPOs). As 
Figure 6 indicates, the birth of high-growth firms 
in the United States displays much more periodicity 
than either the volume of firm formation or the 
steady march of finance.
 So, even if the financial sector’s incessant growth 
overall had no apparent impact on the velocity of 
firm formation, it still may have contributed to a 
larger number of high-growth firms.17 It is plainly 
evident that the eventual emergence of high-growth 
firms is the result of numerous factors beyond 
merely the volume of entrepreneurship. As we 
argue elsewhere, however, a large denominator of 
new firms is a necessary condition for fast-growing 
companies to emerge.18  A growing, and presumably 
more sophisticated, financial sector is likely to be 
one of those factors.
 A second “inside entrepreneurship” indicator is 
the level of IPOs. As measured by Philippon and 
Reshef, “IPO intensity” increased markedly from 
the mid-1980s to the end of the century.19 This is 
an indicator of the effect of a growing financial 
sector on entrepreneurship and, indeed, Philippon 
and Reshef depict it as such. Technological 
developments in the 1960s and 1970s leading to 
17. Because of holes in the data collected by Inc. magazine on the companies it features on its Inc. 500/5,000 lists, annual totals in Figure 6 are not precisely 
comparable. Founding year data was not widely collected prior to 1985, and some subsequent years, such as 2003 and 2004, had little information on the years in 
which companies were founded. (The latter lacuna explains why 1998 appears to have an abnormally low number of companies—the average age of Inc. firms is 
about five to six years.)
18. See Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Neutralism and Entrepreneurship: The Structural Dynamics of Startups, Young Firms, and Job Creation,” Kauffman 
Foundation Research Series on Firm Formation and Economic Growth, Paper No. 6, September 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/firm-formation-
neutralism.pdf.
19. Philippon, T., and Ariell Reshef, “Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry: 1909–2006,” December 2008.
Figure 6: Year Founded: Inc. 500 companies ranked 1 through 65
1982–2010 (1,214 unique companies)
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a boom in computer-related companies, together 
with financial developments in the 1970s, principally 
junk bonds and other higher-risk financing activities, 
precipitated rising IPO intensity that helped to call 
forth a growing financial sector in terms of size, 
relative wages, and human capital levels. The annual 
number of newly listed firms more than tripled, 
rising from 156 per year in the 1970s to 549 per 
year from 1980 to 2001.20 
 Thus, multiple potential mechanisms are at work 
in terms of capital allocation and the consequences 
for entrepreneurship. We have seen that, contrary to 
the standard model of finance, the financial sector’s 
size—presumably a proxy for its activity level—is not 
driving firm formation in the American economy. 
Yet, there may be two additional mechanisms at 
work, which together comprise what we might 
think of as a cannibalization effect. These are the 
distortions introduced by financialization’s pull on 
human capital, particularly entrepreneurial talent, 
and the resulting effect in the types of companies 
that are formed and their performance. It seems 
certain that financialization, an effect and cause of 
entrepreneurial capitalism, subsequently cannibalized 
entrepreneurship in the U.S. economy.
 The growing wage and skill premiums in finance 
attracted individuals who might otherwise have 
started companies. Why, then, wouldn’t the overall 
level of entrepreneurship have fallen? Well, while 
it had mostly stayed flat for the past thirty years, 
closer examination reveals a decline through the 
1980s and then a plateau since 1990. From 1978 
to 1987, the average annual startup rate was 10.4, 
while the average annual establishment entry rate 
was 13.8. Over the subsequent two decades, these 
two rates averaged, respectively, 8.4 and 12.2. 
Importantly, too, the rate has fallen across numerous 
entrepreneurship indicators, even as the absolute 
number of new businesses has remained fairly 
steady, as Figure 7 indicates.
 More worrisome is the drop in entrepreneurial 
intention among certain cohorts of high-skilled 
workers in the United States: middle managers and 
executives.
Figure 7: New Businesses Formed Quarterly, 1993–2009
FmeZ]jg^F]o:mkaf]kk]k$ImYjl]jdq d]^lYpak!
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics   
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20. Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, “New Lists: Fundamentals and Survival Rates,” Journal of Financial Economics. 2004:73(2):229.
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 Thus, we have experienced a falling rate of new 
business creation and falling intention among 
cohorts of workers with presumable entrepreneurial 
talent, as Figure 8 shows. Why, then, has the overall 
volume of entrepreneurship in terms of absolute 
numbers remained steady? One answer could be 
that the quality mix of new companies shifted over 
the past ten to fifteen years. Here we return to 
finance as a potential cause of this shift.
 If democratized finance made it easier for weaker 
(or prospectively weaker) firms to obtain financing, 
then a growing finance sector would have helped 
both to maintain a steady rate of entrepreneurship 
and contributed to the declining quality of new 
companies started. This is difficult to prove, 
especially since survival rates of new firms have not 
changed much since 1977. One indicator we can 
examine is the employment performance of young 
firms—have they performed better, worse, or the 
same over time?
  As shown in Figure 9, the net job-creation rates 
of one-year-old companies closely track the overall 
health of the economy: The recessionary years 
of 1980, 1981, 1982, and 1992 saw negative 
net job creation among companies started one 
year prior, as did 1983, when this would have 
captured firms started in the rough year of 1982. 
The only other string of consecutive negative years 
was 2002 to 2009; this period includes both the 
“jobless recovery” following the 2001 recession 
and the most recent recession of 2008 and 2009. 
Companies founded in 2002 through 2006 
performed just as poorly as those founded during 
recessions. This period also happened to coincide 
with poor performance in terms of initial public 
offerings.
 This could have nothing to do with finance, of 
course, but it is difficult to resist making some 
connection, particularly since these were precisely 
the years during which the financial services industry 
reached its peak in terms of economic share. The 
effect of democratized financing, too, has been 
found to have other consequences. While volatility 
among privately held firms has fallen dramatically 
in the past three decades, the volatility among 
publicly traded firms has risen just as dramatically. 
Figure 8: Entrepreneurship Participation Rates, 1986–2009
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Source: Challenger, Gray & Christmas, Inc.
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Figure 9: Net Job-Creation Rate of One-Year-Old Firms      
Source: BDS
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One reason appears to be easier access to finance 
and, thus, a higher number of IPOs, but without 
a corresponding increase in the quality of those 
companies. Thus, the universe of public firms 
experienced an influx of more volatile firms than 
in years past.21 Financialization boosted volatility 
among publicly traded firms—without raising either 
the number or quality of new companies.
 We might then imagine a cannibalization effect 
at work: Shifts in underlying entrepreneurial activity, 
whether measured by a burst of companies at the 
technological frontier or “IPO intensity,” precipitate 
an increase in financial services. Subsequent 
financialization makes it easier to start companies, 
but, by drawing potential entrepreneurial talent into 
finance while continuing to fund new companies, 
it could suppress both the potential rate of new 
business creation and the quality of businesses 
started.22 
 We now can turn to the question of what 
the American economy might look like once the 
financial sector shrinks as a share of GDP, as it 
seems likely to do. This probably will not entail a 
dramatic decline to 1960s levels, but perhaps a 
decline to the levels we saw in the 1980s. We think 
there would be several effects. First, we should not 
expect a smaller financial sector to cause a rise or 
fall in new business creation, although we might 
anticipate higher social value from new companies. 
We have seen that rising financialization bore 
little apparent relationship to the volume of firm 
formation in the United States. So, while no one can 
predict the trend, we should not expect an impact 
either way from a smaller financial services sector. 
There are, in fact, other reasons to expect a possible 
increase in new business creation and, should we 
enter such an era with a smaller financial sector, we 
might experience a happy concordance between a 
21. Davis, Steven J., et al., “Volatility and Dispersion in Business Growth Rates: Publicly Traded versus Privately Held Firms,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007).
22. The quality issue might be related particularly to branch-banking deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., William R. Kerr and Ramana Nanda, 
“Democratizing Entry: Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints, and Entrepreneurship,” Harvard Business School, Working Paper 07–033, December 2008.
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financial sector focused on “real” wealth creation 
and a steady supply of companies seeking financial 
services. Such a state of affairs would produce more 
economic and social value than would a situation 
with an explosively growing finance sector but 
diminished entrepreneurship. A “smaller” financial 
services sector will be smaller relative to recent 
history—it most likely still will be larger than in prior 
decades and, so, financial intermediaries will not 
lose the ability to provide services important to new 
and young companies. 
 Given the distortions on talent allocation 
across sectors and occupations, we should expect 
improvements in allocative efficiency among 
technical graduates. This does not mean that the 
rise of finance is the primary culprit behind the 
perceived crisis in science and engineering talent 
in the United States. As with entrepreneurship, 
numerous factors lurk beneath human capital 
problems in those areas, and a smaller finance sector 
actually might have a small negative impact in terms 
of reducing one dimension of requisite demand for 
science and engineering talent.23 In particular, falling 
demand in the labor market has contributed to 
rising unemployment (prior to the Great Recession) 
among scientists and engineers. More people in 
science and engineering programs should consider 
entrepreneurship as a career option: New sources of 
talent demand evidently need to be created, and the 
best way to do so is to send entrepreneurs off to the 
frontier to open new paths of economic exploration.
Conclusions and 
Discussion
 In this paper, we tried to re-imagine the U.S. 
economy in the absence of a financial services 
sector larger than its historical role. We consider 
the effects, both positive and negative, of a smaller 
sector, with a particular focus on young and fast-
growing companies, and on the entrepreneurs who 
create those companies.
 The conclusions we reach bear directly on the 
future of the economy. First, a smaller financial 
services sector might not create many more 
companies, but the companies it creates might 
have higher social value. Second, a smaller financial 
services sector still could provide the financial 
intermediation services that are most important 
to young companies. Third, a U.S. economy with 
a smaller financial sector would cause fewer 
distortions in capital allocation.
 What might we expect in terms of a boost to 
business creation? Were the finance sector to shrink 
in terms of its GDP share back to the levels of the 
1980s, say, we might expect an increase of two or 
three percentage points in the entrepreneurship 
rate—back to where it stood through the 1980s, as 
well. This obviously is not as precise as we would 
like it to be, but, given the allocation and financing 
issues discussed here, it seems likely that we could 
see several thousand new businesses formed 
each year, to say nothing of the quality of those 
companies. 
 The financial sector shrinkage in the coming 
years also will coincide with other trends that, 
independent of the retreat of financialization, should 
provide a boost to American entrepreneurship. 
Together with a contracting financial sector, 
however, these emerging trends should be amplified 
and contribute to a substantial increase in firm 
formation. Such trends include the falling cost 
of starting a company, largely as the result of 
technological change. This decline does not apply 
exclusively to the information technology sector, 
23. Lowell, B. Lindsay, and Harold Salzman, “Into the Eye of the Storm: Assessing the Evidence on Science and Engineering Education, Quality, and Workforce 
Demand,” Urban Institute, October 2007, at http://www.urban.org/publications/411562.html.
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as many might say. Indeed, the emergence of 
organizations and phenomena such as TechShop 
and Maker Faire have lowered the barriers to entry 
even in sectors such as advanced manufacturing. 
The continuing integration, too, between 
cyberspace and the “real” economy means that 
it has become easier to start physically based 
companies with greater reach.24 Additionally, U.S. 
demographic trends, while often presented in 
universally negative fashion, have the potential to 
boost entrepreneurship.25 In short, the reversal of 
financialization and the flowering of parallel trends 
could work to substantially increase firm formation.
 What will be—or what could be—the impact 
of these companies? Every generation claims, 
tiresomely, that in its particular era the country 
faces serious challenges on a different order from 
any prior age. Some of today’s challenges—such 
as energy, infrastructure, and health care—were 
familiar to foregoing generations. What sets them 
apart in the contemporary context is their sheer 
economic, and political, and social complexity. 
Saying that the United States, indeed the globe, 
faces an energy challenge implies a host of issues: 
climate change, regulatory barriers, infrastructure 
shortcomings, national security issues, developing 
alternative sources to fossil fuels, and so on. The 
same could be said of other areas. But it is their 
very complexity that, perhaps ironically, makes them 
perfect areas for entrepreneurship, new ideas, and 
new entrants. Startup firms specialize—in a way 
that larger and more-established companies can 
barely contemplate—in attacking complex problems 
in cheaper and more efficient ways. For the leading 
areas in need of entrepreneurship today, scientists 
and engineers are essential to start firms or join new 
companies.
 A reversal of financialization might act as one 
mechanism in pushing this along. Without being 
Panglossian about the contraction in the financial 
services sector, we think there are important 
consequences in the industry’s restructuring toward 
a smaller size. There will be job losses in financial 
services, some of which will be counterbalanced by 
job creation by young companies that otherwise 
might not have existed. Given our need for 
entrepreneurs to bring products and services to 
market that help us with some of the most difficult 
and complex societal problems we have ever faced, 
there could not be a more auspicious time for  
the change.
24. For additional discussion of these trends, see Dane Stangler and Paul Kedrosky, “Neutralism and Entrepreneurship: The Structural Dynamics of Startups, Young 
Firms, and Job Creation,” Kauffman Foundation Research Series on Firm Formation and Economic Growth, Paper No. 6, September 2010, at http://www.kauffman.org/
research-and-policy/neutralism-and-entrepreneurship.aspx. 
25. See, e.g., Dane Stangler, “The Coming Entrepreneurship Boom,” Kauffman Foundation, June 2009.
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